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JONATHON R. MOORE*

The Future of Scientific Research
in Contiguous Resource Zones:
Legal Aspects
Introduction
Myron Nordquist recently stated that under current international law of the
sea "scientific research will die a slow death."1 It is the growing practice of
nations to unilaterally claim jurisdiction over ocean resources within 200 miles
of their coasts. "Patrimonial seas" 2 or "contiguous resource zones" give the
coastal State exclusive or preferential resource jurisdiction. While it appears
that the States making such claims will allow freedom of navigation, there is
every likelihood that freedom of sceintific research which now exists outside of
the territorial sea will not be protected. The United Nations Law of the Sea
Conference will convene in 1974 with the hope of resolving the unsettled
resource questions. The outcome of this conference will determine the future of
marine scientific research in contiguous resource zones.
Much is at stake in an international agreement on oceanic scientific research.
All mankind has an interest in the facilitation of such research. 3 As expressed
by the Hon. Donald L. McKerman:
The continued acquisition of information ... will have an important bearing on
man's future welfare and may be a determining factor in our capacity to cope with the
growing problems of the pollution ...

or to develop technology required to make full

use of both living and non-living resources available in the oceans. 4

Legal boundaries, however, exist to protect the rights of States; they are
artificial and bear no relationship to scientific realities. 5
*1974 Candidate for J.D., George Washington Univ., National Law Center; Articles Editor,
Journal of International Law and Economics.
'Mr. Nordquist is an attorney in the Office of Ocean Affairs, U.S. State Department, and made
the remark at a recent lecture at the National Law Center, George Washington University.
'See Declaration of Santo Domingo (7 June, 1972).
3
Working Paper submitted by the Canadian Delegation to Sub-committee III of the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction
(hereinafter, Sub-committee III of the Sea-bed Committee), Principles on Marine Scientific
Research, A/AC. 138/SC. III/L. 18 (25 July, 1972) (Hereinafter "Canadian Draft Principles.")
Preamble.
'U.S.I.A press release. Statement to Sub-committee Il, 17 August 1971.
'E.D. Brown, Freedom of Scientific Research and the Legal Regime of Hydrospace, 9 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 327 (1969).
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Articulate spokesmen for the scientific community describe the bounty to be
gained from open access to the seas for research: the answers to global
pollution, 6 weather control, 7 and resource exhaustability.8 At the same time,
coastal States are demanding protection of their newly claimed resources.
Researchers thus believe that the future of science and all mankind is at stake, 9
while coastal States argue that their commercial and military interests are in
jeopardy. Any new agreement, therefore, must carefully balance these interests.
This article will focus on the future of scientific research in contiguous
resource zones. It is the unsettled legal status of such research which compels its
interest to both scientists and lawyers. If we neglect scientific research in inland
waters, territorial seas and high seas, it is because their legal status, and hence
their scientific status, is well settled. 10 Bilateral and multilateral treaties will
continue to govern research in territorial seas 11 and inland waters. 12 Research
on the high seas will in all probability remain unrestricted under the principle of
Freedom of Seas. 13 Continual reference will necessarily be made to scientific
research under the Continental Shelf Convention, 14 because under current
international law the continental shelf is the only recognized resource zone
beyond the territorial sea.
Historical Perspective
Before describing the current state of the law, it is necessary to examine
briefly the historical practices of States with regard to scientific research in the
oceans. According to Columbos,15 research vessels were traditionally granted
immunity from seizure during hostilities. 16 "It is manifest, however, that a
government will require full information on the objects of the expedition before
granting safe conduct."1 7 In absence of war, uninhibited transit by researchers
'See Knauss, Development of the Freedom of Scientific Research Issue at the Third Law of the
Sea Conference, 1 OCEAN DEV. AND INT'L L. J. 93 (1973) at 101.
'V.Wooster, Oceanographyand InternationalOcean Affairs, 5 PACEM IN MARIBUS 1175 (1970)
at 176; and National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, Report to the President and
Congress, at 19 (1972).
1E.M. Borgese, The Seas: A Common Heritage, 5 THE CENTER MAG. 13 (March, 1972) at 20.
"'The need to consider the environment as a whole is scientific imperative, for the oceans and
atmosphere and solid earth are interacting parts of a single geophysical continuum. Eventually,
man must understand the sea, the air, and the land as a single, incredibly complex system."
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR NATION
AND THE SEA: A PLAN FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1969).

"See discussion infra on the current state of the law regarding scientific research in the territorial
sea and on the high seas, notes 24 to 36 and accompanying text.
"Such as I.O.C. Resolution VI-13 (1969).
"Such as the Western Hemisphere Treaty.
"HuGo GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM.

115 U.S.T. 471 (1964), T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
"COLUMBOS, INT'L LAW OF THE SEA (3rd ed.) at 447.
"See French Instructions of 1934 (art. 30) and the Italian War Laws of 1938 (art. 145). These
exempt enemy vessels employed on scientific, religious, or humanitarian missions.
"COLUMBOS, supra; see also art. 4 of Hague Convention No. XI.
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was encouraged. John A. Knauss summarizes the historical development of law
regulating scientific research in this way:
Perhaps one of the difficulties marine scientists have at present is that they have
been spoiled. Until recently they were free to travel anywhere on the ocean and collect
whatever they wished. A hundred years ago, scientists did the same thing on land.
They could trace the headwaters of the Nile, dig for Troy, study the geology of the
Alps, or explore Inca ruins all without passports or visas or little concern for political
interference. It has been a long time since scientists could move about the land at will,
but until very recently, it has been possible to do so on the sea. 18
Warren S. Wooster attributes recent difficulties of researchers to a number
of factors such as the growth of oceanography, the increased number of coastal
States, and the widening of the development gap. 19 Both Knauss and Wooster
note that the major difference between present times and the colonial period is
that during the colonial period there was little concern about the obscure
science of oceanography.
Another factor affecting oceanic research has been the practice of States that
have declared jurisdiction over an exclusive resource zone. Wooster, 20
Schaefer, 21 and Burke22 document the growing restrictions and limitations
that inhibit scientific inquiry. Consent is sometimes arbitrarily denied.
Inconvenient or unacceptable conditions are often imposed. Time-consuming
and costly administrative requirements at times are so onerous that it is futile to
apply for a research permit. While these conditions do not confront researchers
off every coast, the choice of investigative opportunities is occasionally
determined by the need to obtain a clearance. This trend toward greater
restriction is a marked contrast to the historical practice of States.
23
The Current State of the Law

The 1958 and 1960 Geneva Conventions also contributed to the erosion of the
historic freedom of access available to scientists. New rules, as well as inherent
contradictions, ambiguities and omissions make the current law of the sea
anything but resolved with regard to scientific research in contiguous zones.
Freedom of scientific research remains in force on the high seas under
"8Knauss, FactorsInfluencing a U.S. Position in a FutureLaw of the Sea Conference, Occasional
Paper No. 10, LAw OF THE SEA INSTITUTE (1971) at 18. See also Knauss, supra note 6: "No one
questioned the right of Darwin to leave the Beagle and to go ashore when and where he wanted to
collect what was necessary." 1 OCEAN DEv. AND INT'L L. J. 93 at 94.
"9Wooster, Ocean Research Dilemma (1973), unpublished.
201d.
"Schaefer, The ChangingLaw of the Sea-Effects on Freedom of Scientifc Investigation,2 L. SEA
REP. 114 (1967).
"Burke, Marine Science Research and InternationalLaw,Occasional Paper No. 8, LAW OF THE
SEA INSTITUTE (1970).
"See generally United States Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Law of the Sea
Crisis : An Intensifying Polarization,Part 2 (May, 1972) at 5.
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international law. Article 2 of the Convention on The High Seas24 states that
"The High Seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty." A list of four freedoms are
specified. Although freedom of scientific research is not one of the enumerated
freedoms,25 it is nevertheless a part of freedom of the seas under the broad
language of the Article. 26
Lest any one attempt to apply the principle of statutory construction of
inclusio unius exclusio alterius, 27 the International Law Commission settled

any ambiguity regarding freedom of scientific research in its commentary to
Draft Article 27, now Article 2:
The list of freedoms ... is not restrictive. The Commission has merely specified four
of the main freedoms, but it is aware that there are other freedoms, such as freedom to
28
undertake scientific research.

Although some commentators argue that the exclusion of the principle of
freedom of scientific research from the express language of Article 2 has placed
the principle in a precarious position, 29 it is resolved that in areas that are
unquestionably high seas, there exists the freedom of scientific research under
international law. 30

No such principle exists in the territorial sea. 31 Article 1 of the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 3 2 states that the sovereignty of the
coastal State extends to the waters of its territorial sea. Just as any State has the
right to prohibit scientific research within its borders, the coastal State has the
power to exclude researchers from its waters. A recent UNESCO Report 33
suggested that the right of innocent passage 34 be re-interpreted to allow
scientific research in territorial seas.
Professor E.D. Brown points out that "there is, however, surely no question
2413 U.S.T. 2312 (1964), T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
"At the time the convention was drafted, there was considerable fear that inclusion of a specific
provision on freedom of scientific research would be used to justify nuclear weapons testing in the
oceans.
"This is indicated from the words inter alia and from the mention of "other" freedoms "which
are recognized by the general principles of international law."
"See Testimony ofArthurH. Dean before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 85 (1960).
2
Francois, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the General Assembly, 2 INT'L L.
COMM. Y.B. 256, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
29
Goldie, The Contents ofDavy Jones'sLocker-A ProposedRegime for the Seabed and Subsoil,
22 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 at 49. Goldie finds the "traveau preparatories of little assistance in
determining the intended scope of the freedom to engage in scientific research."
"Schaefer, supra note 21 and 1972 Report of the Sea-bed Committee. GAOR Supp. 21 (A/8721)
(1972) at 60, paragraph 243. (Hereinafter "1972 Sea-bed Committee Report.")
"1972 Sea-bed Committee Report at 62.
3215 U.S.T. 1606 (1964), T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
3
1IOC Summary Report of First Meeting of Working Group Related to Scientific Investigations in
the Ocean, AVS/9/89M (1968).
"Codified by Articles 14-17 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
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that [coastal States] have the right to prohibit [scientific research] carried out in
the course of 'innocent passage' through the territorial sea. For both economic
and security reasons, the coastal State may well wish to prohibit the use of all
electronic gear other than that required for navigational purposes."35
Furthermore, coastal States can legally regulate or exclude any unmanned
research buoys from their territorial seas. 36
Under the Continental Shelf Convention the coastal State has jurisdiction
over the exploration and exploitation of the resources on the continental shelf
and subsoil. 37 Coastal States have exclusive rights to the resources, but must
allow scientific research under the provisions of Article 5:
1-The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources
must not result ...in any interference with fundamental oceanographic or other
scientific research carried out with the intention of open publication...
8-The consent of the coastal State shall be obtained with respect to any research
concerning the continental shelf and undertaken there. Nevertheless, the coastal
State shall not normally withhold its consent if the request is submitted by a
qualified institution with a view to purely scientific research into the physical or
biological characteristics of the continental shelf, subject to the provision that the
coastal State shall have the right, if it so desires, to participate or be represented in
the research, and that in any event the results shall be published.
Under Article 5, coastal States should not restrict fundamental scientific
research as long as the researchers seek the consent of the coastal State, permit
participation by the coastal State, and publish the results.
Research in waters above the continential shelf, seaward of the territorial
sea, 38 is governed by the High Seas Convention. 39 Article 3 of the Continental
Shelf Convention makes this explicit: "the rights of the coastal State over the
continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters of the
high seas."
Freedom of scientific research is likewise in force within waters of the
contiguous zone. The contiguous zone, in which the coastal State has territorial
sea jurisdiction over special interests, 40 retains the general legal characteristics
of the high seas: 41
1"E.D. Brown, supra note 5 at 329. See also 1972 Sea-bed Committee Report at 62.

"See generally,

UNESCO,

INTERGOVERNMENTAL

OCEANOGRAPHIC

COreMISSION

AND

INTERGOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTIVE ORGANIZATION, LEGAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED
WITH OCEAN DATA ACoUISTION SYSTEMS (ODAS) [IOC/INF-108 (revised), January, 1969].

"Art. 2.
3
Hereinafter the term, "continental shelf" is used in its legal meaning, not its geological meaning
as defined in Art. 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention. Thus, the continental shelf is "the seabed
and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea."
3
I.L.C., COMMENTARY TO DRAFT ARTICLE 68, Francois, Report of the InternationalLaw
Commission to the General Assembly (1956): "Freedom to conduct scientific research in these
waters [above a continental shelf-which still form part of the high seas-is in no way affected [by
the Continental Shelf Convention, art. 5]. The coastal State will not have the right to prohibit scientific research. The consent of the State will only be required for research relating to the exploration
and exploitation of the seabed or subsoil."
4
Under art. 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones, four specialized
coastal state interests are recognized: customs, fiscals, sanitary and immigration.
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International Law accords States the right to exercise preventive or protective
control for certain purposes over a belt of the high seas contiguous to their territorial
sea. It is, of course, understood that this power of control does not change the legal
status of the waters over which it is exercised. These waters are and remain a part of
the high seas. 4 2
The legal status of scientific research in the contiguous zone and in waters
superjacent to the continental shelf is thus identical with its legal status in the
high seas.
Current Problem Areas
The current legal status of scientific research in the oceans has a certain
symmetry and logic: research is restricted or prohibited in the territorial sea,
regulated on the continental shelf,43 and unrestricted on the high seas.
Four basic problems, however confront the researcher in defining the legality
of his research near coastal waters. First, the width of the territorial sea is not
fixed in international law. The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Seas did
not settle this problem, 44 and, as a result, States now made varying claims to a
territorial sea from three miles to 200 miles. The lack of uniformity means that
researchers must plan projects on a State by State basis, because, for example,
research four miles from the coast would in some cases be in the high seas, but
in other cases be in the territorial sea. 4 5
The second problem is that the limits of the continental shelf are likewise not
precisely delineated under the Continental Shelf Convention. The outer limit of
the continental shelf has an "expandable" definition:46 a depth of 200 meters
or the limits of man's exploitability. Rapidly developing technology has made it
possible for coastal States to claim jurisdiction over sea-bed areas beyond the
200 meter isobath. The impact on scientific research is to place further large

"Art. 1 of the High Seas Convention defines the High Seas as "all parts of the sea that are not
included in the territorial sea or internal waters of a State."
1

2

1.L.C.,

COMMENTARY TO

DRAFT

ARTICLE

and Contiguous Zone. Francois supra, note 28.
43

66, (now art. 24, Convention of the Territorial Sea

According to art. 5 of the Continental Shelf Convention.

"Art. 6, Convention on the High Seas and Contiguous Zone states: "The outer limit of the
territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a distance from the nearest point of the baseline
equal to the breadth of the territorial sea defined.
"5Art. 6 when read with art. 24 would seem to imply a limit of 12 miles to the territorial sea.
Nevertheless, current State practices often extend jurisdiction beyond 12 miles. See chart of
nations who have done this in LAY, CHURCHILL, NoRDQUIST,NEW DIRECTIONS IN LAW OF THE SEA

(1973) at 833.
"Art. 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention has been sharply criticized for its ambigious or
expandable definition of the continental shelf, as either the 200-meter isobath or wherever the
natural resources are exploitable. See generally: E.D. BROwN, THE LEGAL REGIME OF
(1971), Chapter 1; and SPECIAL SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF OF THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, Issues Relating to
HYDROSPACE

the Establishment of SeawardBoundaries of United States ContinentalShelf (1970).
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areas of ocean space under coastal State regulation.
The expandable definition is of particular consequence in light of the third
problem facing researchers:47 scientists need not make physical contact with
the continental shelf to be doing research "there." Thus, even though Article 3
of the Continental Shelf Convention explicitly states that the superjacent waters
of the continental shelf are high seas, coastal States can regulate research under
Article 5. This has been an area of controversy for some time.
The official U.S. position is that research on the continental shelf pertains to
such activities as taking core samples, dredging or removing living and
non-living sedentary resources. 48 This interpretation has not prevailed 4 9
"perhaps because it is based on a logical fallacy. Much of what we know about
the continental shelf is from seismic, magnetic and gravity observations which
are nearly always made from a ship whose instruments are not in contact with
the bottom."50
The ramifications for the researcher of this interpretation of Article 5 and the
expandable definition of the continental shelf are that large portions of the high
seas contiguous to territorial seas are within the jurisdiction of the coastal State
with regard to scientific research. The 1971 report of the Sea-Bed Committee
stated that "In accordance with the applicable rules of international law,
freedom of scientific research is not unrestricted, since it is subject to conditions
that would allow the coastal State to verify at any moment the scientific nature
of the research."Sl Scientists have thus lost the traditional freedom of scientific
research in waters superjacent to a potentially increasingly expandable
continental shelf-even though these waters are legally the high seas. 5 2
The fourth problem facing researchers is the growing practice of States of
declaring contiguous resource zones. 53 These zones do not fit the rationale of
either the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, or the continental shelf with
regard to the provisions on scientific research. Is the researcher to regard the
contiguous resource zone like a territorial sea with no right to access for
research purposes? Is he to view it as a limited resource zone for exploitation
such as the continental shelf, and by analogy apply the principles and policies of
Article 5 to research in the contiguous resource zone? Is he to regard "resource
"Until recently, this was not the case. See

PADDLEFORD, OCEANIC RESEARCH IN FOREIGN

WATERS IN PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE SEAS (1970).
"INTERAGENCY COMMITI-EE ON OCEANOGRAPHY,

U.S.

OCEANIC

RESEARCH

IN

FOREIGN

WATERS at 7.
"Interestingly enough, while the U.S. has advocated this narrow, strict-constructionist reading of
art. 5 on behalf of its oceanographers doing research above foreign continental shelves, it has
nevertheless not encouraged research without State Department consent in waters superjacent to the
U.S. continental shelf. Sullivan, Freedom of Scientific Inquiry, L. SEA REP. 345 (1969).
"Knauss, supra note 6, at 120, n. 46.
26 GAOR Supp. 21 (1971).
"Another consequence of this interpretation is to inhibit freedom of navigation on the high seas.
"Representative examples of coastal States' laws creating such zones are compiled in LAY,
CHURCHILL, NORDQUIST, supra note 45, at 64-99.
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exploitation" as merely one more specific enumerated interest of the contiguous
zone as those listed under Article 24 of the High Seas and Contiguous Zone
Convention; that is, for example, fishing or oil exploitation are narrowly defined
interests of the coastal State and may be regulated, whereas all other interests,
such as scientific research, retain the legal status as set forth in the Convention
on the High Seas? There are no legal answers in any of the Geneva Conventions.
Analogous to all conventions, but related to none, coastal State treatment of
scientific research in contiguous resource zones is at this time ad hoc and sui
generis.
The only authority in international law on these questions at this time is the
practice of States to view the regulation of scientific research as a collateral right
that is necessary to safeguard the asserted proprietary resource interest. The
United States, for example, claims the right under a law establishing a
contiguous fisheries zone 54 to prohibit fisheries research within this zone
without its consent. 55 E.D. Brown writes that the status of fisheries research in
the United Kingdom's contiguous fisheries zone "must be open to the same
interpretation." 56 Likewise, the broad language of the European Fisheries
Convention 5 7 gives coastal States the power "to regulate the fisheries."58 The
presumption here again must be that fisheries research is included. 59
While the above prohibitions pertain to fisheries research, it is the
overbreadth of regulation that threatens the freedom of access for scientific
researchers. The State Department, for example, defines fisheries research as
"the study of biology, environment, abundance, availability or exploitation of
fish or other aquatic organisms for the purpose of facilitative utilization of the
organism for sport or for commercial use." 60 In spite of its linguistic precision,
the regulation is difficult to objectively enforce because the crucial distinction it draws is based on intent. Other States can, of course, be less
precise and take the position that all research in the resource zone can be
excluded. Increasingly, this is the practice of those States claiming a contiguous
resource zone. There is nevertheless no authority in international law that would
support such rights ancillary to patrimonial sea resource rights.
Article 5(8) of the Continental Shelf Convention
Article 5 of the Continental Shelf Convention provides a general rule of
policy, yet its vagueness and inherent contradictions create many problems in its
U.S.C. 1091-94 (1970); legislative history at 1966 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News 3282.
"Schaefer, Freedomof Scientific Research and Exploration in the Sea, 4 STAN. J. INTL STUDIES
46, 63 (1969).
1416

' 6Brown, supra note 5 at 344.

'Gr. Brit. T.S. 35, Cmmd.3011 (1966).
"Id. at 5.
"Brown, supra note 5, at 343.
°Cited in Schaefer, supra note 55.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 8, No. 2
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practical application. Article 5(1) posits non-interference with research by
coastal States while Article 5(8) enumerates requirements for consent of the
coastal State. Within the breadth of Article 5 is the possibility for arbitrary
denial of consent to research on the continental shelf. Research must be by a
"qualified" institution, but no criteria define "qualified." Coastal States cannot interfere with research "carried out with the intention of open publication,"
yet as John Knauss writes, "a regulation where the interpretation hangs on
intent is not an easy one to enforce in an objective manner." 61 While a coastal
State may not "normally withhold its consent," the phrase is hardly an
imperative directive. 62
Further confusion arises regarding the question as to what kind of research
the coastal State can allow or can deny. Article 5(8) implies that consent can be
withheld if the research is not "purely scientific research into the physical or
biological characteristics of the continental shelf." The qualifying words, "with
a view to," however, indicate that the determination depends on intent.
Article S(1) on the other hand seems to allow scientific research "other"
than "fundamental" as long as there is an intention to publish. The relationship
to the final phrase of Article 5(8), that "in any event the results shall be
published," adds further confusion. Criticism that the provisions regarding
publication, fundamental research and consent are either self-contradictory or
tautological has led several writeres to urge that Article 5 be modified63 or
deleted. 64
The above discussion on consent is predicated on the fact that "pure" or
"fundamental" scientific research is definable. That no definition of scientific
research is provided is perhaps the greatest shortcoming of Article 5. John A.
Knauss summarized the difficulty of reaching a definition in this way:
The line between pure and fundamental research (i.e. research for scientific truth)
and applied research (i.e. research for scientific knowledge applicable to national
security or resource exploitation) is not an easy one to define. The scientific skills and
techniques are often identical; at times judgment must be made on the basis of explicit

or implied intent of the group doing the research. A government or corporate
expedition is usually thought to be doing applied research while university groups are
thought to be doing pure research. 65
The matter is further complicated when the same research vessel will engage

'Knauss, supra note 18.
'2Clingan, Scientific Inquiry in the Oceans Legal Regulations and Responsibility, 6 LEX ET
ScIrrIA 77 (1969).
' 3Goldie, supra note 29.
"McDOUGAL AND BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962); and Schaefer, supra note
21. 3
" Knauss, Testimony before U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Sub-committee on Ocean Spaces, 25
July 1969.
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in pure research one month and classified military research the next; 66 where
university professors serve as consultants to oil companies; and where, for
example, the Office of Naval Research supports most of the "pure" ocean
research in the United States.67 Even "pure" scientists have been known to
take a commercial contract at times. 68 Furthermore, rarely is any scientific
information immediately applicable; the pure research of today is the applied
data of tomorrow. Perhaps it is specious to premise consent upon any definition
of fundamental research, because as William L. Sullivan writes, "No
satisfactory definition has been devised." 6 9
The Future of Scientific Research
If circumscribed by the present Law of the Sea Conventions and the current
practice of coastal States, the future of scientific research in contiguous resource
zones is in jeopardy. The progress of all mankind will be eclipsed if the patterns
of the present are allowed to have their inevitable effect on the future. There are
outlined below some of the considerations which the drafters of a new
Convention on Marine Scientific Research must consider if the treaty is to
insure the best interests of all nations.
The PoliticalClimate
Before describing specific hurdles to agreement, it is necessary briefly to note
the political climate 70 out of which any new agreement must come. The
preliminary negotiations to the 1974 Law of the Sea Conference have
demonstrated an increasing polarization on the question of scientific research
between the developed and the developing nations. 71 As Mrs. Borgese writes:
Research... is still carried out under national auspices of a few highly developed
and rich nations. Freedom of scientific research, then, inevitably means freedom of
research for the rich nations. It is understandable that other nations, not able to
participate and not tangibly benefiting from such research, are not overly concerned
about this freedom, which they resent as an interference with their sovereignty or as a
pretext for exploitation. 72
6WIhe captain of the Pueblo claimed the ship was engaged in oceanographic and sun spot
research. Cmdr. Lloyd Bucher, Bucher: My Story (1970), The Times [London] reported that the
Department of Defense claimed the Pueblo was an environmental research ship, 24 January 1968.
7
Knauss, supra note 18.
6'Sullivan, supra note 49.
691d.
0
" See generally, Friedheim, Ocean Science in the UN Political Arena, 3 J. MARITIME L. 473
(1972); and PYE, OCEAN POLICY AND SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM 8 (1972).
"Evidence of this polarization surfaced in the United Nations in the reception accorded President
Johnson's proposal for an International Decade of Ocean Exploration. Resolution 2467 of
December, 1968, received General Assembly endorsement but was subject to considerable
reservation on the part of developing States. Burke, Law, Science, and the Ocean, Occasional Paper
No. 3 (1969), LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE.
"Borgese, supra note 8 at 21.
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Resentment and suspicion, 73 however, recently seem to be articulated into a
demand by developing nations to share the wealth and power inherent in
scientific research. The Brazilian delegate to the Sea-Bed Committee states, "In
the last analysis, every particle of scientific knowledge can be translated into
terms of economic gain or national security, and, in a technological society,
74
scientific knowledge means power."
Regarding scientific research as power or wealth that can be shared may be a
way to resolve the pessimism now facing those attempting to reconcile the
dichotomization of rich and poor nations with regard to scientific research. The
redefinition of Subcommittee III subject matter as "Scientific Research and
Transfer of Technology" in April, 1973, indicates some progress in this area.
Another significant factor in the political arena is the relatively low priority
assigned to reaching agreement on marine scientific research. The focus of
negotiations will be the resource questions and the structure of a sea-bed
regime. Some of the developed nations, which are the advocates for open
research, may be willing to shift their positions on scientific research to gain
other concessions. The United States, for example, places a very high priority
on freedom of transit through international straits and will negotiate in other
areas to reach an agreement that protects navigational rights. 75
Developing nations often assign low priority to scientific research questions,
because they see little use in the technologies being developed. In addition to
viewing possible agreements as a threat to their resource interest, developing
countries may be reluctant to agree solely out of nationalistic pride. 76 Thus,
although the issues with regard to scientific research, the rights of coastal states,
and the needs of science are readily discerned, the fact that agreement on these
issues must take place within the complex context of resource allocation and
sea-bed regime constitutionalism significantly lessens the likelihood of
agreement. 77
Basic Structure of the Convention
New international law on scientific research should be in the form of a
separate and distinct convention on Marine Scientific Research, hereinafter
"the Convention." This approach would overcome the current piecemeal
treatment of scientific research in a few scattered provisions in different
Conventions. Subcommittee III concluded in its most recent report to the
"See Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Law of the Sea Crisis 3 (19/1).
74
A/AC. 138/S.R. 54 (1971) p. 9; see also U.S. OceanographyProgramsRuns Afoul of Brazilian
National Feeling, Scientific Research (October 28, 1968) at 23.
"Remarks of John Stevenson to the Sea-hed Committee, 65 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 261 (1971).
"Statement of Dr. Phillip Handler, President, National Academy of Sciences before
Subcommittee III, 29 March 1973. Press Release USUN 29 (73), at 6.
"See generally: E.D. Brown, The 1973 Conference on The Law of the Sea: The Consequences of
Failureto Agree, 6 LAW OF THE SEA REPTS. (1971) at 67; and Knauss, The Prospects of Scientific
Research in Marine Technology Society, LAW OF THE SEA REPORTS: GENEVA REPORT (1972).
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General Assembly that, "There is a need to formulate general principles
governing oceanic research which, while acknowledging the unity of the marine
environment, must not ignore the diversity of regimes existing in different
marine areas." 78 The first proposals for a separate Convention were presented
at the April, 1973, New York meeting by Malta 7 9 and by the governments of
80
Russia, Poland and Bulgaria.
The main focus of the Convention should be to protect the resource interests
of the coastal States and insure open access to data for scientists. Its method
should be to articulate objective standards that will implement the above
purposes. The provisions of the Convention discussed below would be
applicable to research in a contiguous resource zone, which would begin at the
limits of the territorial sea and encompass a resource zone of width determined
at the Law of the Sea Conference. The Convention envisions an international
organization that would bind parties to compulsory arbitration in case of
disputes.
The suggestions that follow are based on the premise that scientists are most
eager to have access to as much of ocean space as is possible, and that coastal
States seek most to protect their resource interests. The protection of military
interests need not be the concern of the Convention, as it is assumed that the
residuum of complete sovereign jurisdiction of the coastal State in its territorial
waters will be adequate military protection. Moreover, when scientific research
is conducted outside the territorial sea:
It is difficult to imagine how oceanographic information could be used to the
81
military disadvantage of the developing State.

The territorial sea provides an adequate buffer against surveillance or invasion.
Provisions of the Convention
The convention should allow any research in the resource zone, whether
fundamental or applied, subject to a number of provisions that will protect the
commercial interest of the coastal State in the resources. These provisions
compel the consent of the coastal State to allow research if the researchers (1)
give adequate notice to the coastal State, (2) allow coastal State nationals to
participate in the work, (3) return all samples to the coastal State, and (4)
82
publish the results.
The eradication of the line between fundamental and applied research 83 is at
78
GAOR
79

Supp. 21 (A/8721) (1972), at 60.
A/AC. 138/SC. III/L. 34, 23 March 1973.
10A/AC. 138/SC. III/L. 31, 15 March 1973.
"Wooster and Redfield, Consequences of Regulatory Oceanic Research (1973, unpublished).
"For a comprehensive survey of the view of U.S. oceanographers on possible controls on research,
see Conrad H. Cheek, Law of the Sea: Effects of Varying Coastal State Controls on Marine
Research, unpublished report of Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 22 December 1972.
"Canadian Draft Principles, preamble.
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the heart of the Convention. Wooster points out that:
The need to distinguish "fundamental" scientific research from other kinds is
largely tactical. Scientists recognize that such a distinction has little real meaning and
is extremely difficult to make in practice. 84
If coastal States' interests are fully protected, research of all kinds can be
open. 85 For example, if all samples are the property of the coastal State, coastal
nationals participate, and all results are published, it is irrelevant whether the
vessel taking fisheries samples is conducting fundamental or commercial
research. When research is rarely immediately applicable, and when research is
only proprietary, industrial or commercial in as much as it is secret, it is
unnecessary to make a distinction between fundamental and applied research,
if coastal States are protected by the provisions below.
Coastal States must not be allowed the arbitrary power to deny consent to
perform research. This is the greatest problem with current law and practice. As
we have seen, the ambiguity of Article 5 of the Continental Shelf Convention
permits coastal States to deny consent to "unqualified" researchers, to those
who may not "intend" to publish, and to scientists doing "other than
fundamental" research. The new Convention must anticipate harsh
administrative measures and preclude their use by objectively setting forth
uniform and equitable standards. Specific examples of harsh requirements that
will be excluded are six-month notice requirements, 8 6 fees, coastal State
control of research topics or itineraries, and coastal State limitations on the
dissemination of information. Removing power to deny consent will not,
however, prejudice the coastal State, because consent will be predicated on
conditions that safeguard the coastal State's resource interests.
Notice
The notice provisions of the Convention should allow a fair time for coastal
States to make adequate plans to participate in the research, and yet not burden
researchers with the necessity to make distant plans. Researchers should be
required to notify the coastal State of their intent to undertake research in the
exclusive resource zone at least two months in advance. 87 Notice would include
preliminary plans for the route of the research vessel, a detailed description of
the research topic, plans for publication, a request for consent, and an offer for
coastal State nationals to participate. At least two weeks prior to the
"4Wooster, Contents of the Negotiations: Scientific Research, 6 L. OF SEA REPT. 130 (1971).
"See National Academy of Sciences, Ocean Affairs Board, International Marine Science Affairs
Policy Committee, Proposed U.S. Position on the Question of Freedom for Science in the Oceans,
16 February 1972.
"See, for example, Brazilian Decree of 28 August 1968, requiring 180-day notice for any
research. The decree also elaborated complex administrative procedures.
"The 1973 Malta draft suggests 6 weeks.
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commencement of the expedition, researchers would provide final cruise plans,
88
and coastal States would designate participants.
Coastal State Participation
Provisions regarding participation by coastal States in research must be
drafted with particular care to insure that they accomplish their purposes:
protection of military and commerical interests and sharing of technology, that
is, the wealth and power of scientific knowledge. Participation by coastal States
must be understood to be a right, 89 any infringement of which would
automatically terminate coastal State consent for the project. The provisions on
participation must be adhered to if the coastal State is to truly benefit from the
project.
Coastal State nationals must have access to all equipment and data on the
vessel. The right to observe and question every aspect of the research will protect
coastal States from military surveillance under the guise of research.
Researchers must train and meaningfully utilize participants in every phase
of the project: compiling, analyzing and interpreting data. Admittedly, it is this
provision that will be the most difficult to enforce. The Convention can compel
researchers to provide translators and special training as well as a certain
minimum number of participants, but it cannot guarantee tangible benefits to
the coastal State as a result of participation. The difficulty is that for
participation to be more than observation involves intangible (and
unenforceable) human communication.
There are, however, other major barriers to fulfilling coastal State
expectations in sharing in the benefits of research. Dr. Macedo of Brazil
recognized the first as "The real problem is participation

. .

. [which] must be

based on more education and training than is now available. Until the ability of
developing nations to participate in general scientific research becomes a
reality, suspicion will remain . . . "90
Another problem is that raw data is for the most part meaningless. The real
practice of science involves the selection of meaningful data, and this
sometimes takes place in sophisticated laboratories in developed countries
months later. 91 The Convention can remedy some of these potential problems
by providing that coastal State participation does not terminate when the
research vessel leaves the resource zone, but continues until the publication of
the results.
While the scientific, community might complain that the burdens of including
"Generally, present attitudes on the problems of notice may be found at GAOR Supp. 21, at 62.
""Declaration of the Latin American States on the Law of the Sea" (The Declaration of Lima),
August, 1970, Common Principles of the Law of the Sea, # 5.
"Quoted in Borgese, supra note 8.
9"Dr. Sidney Holt, quoted id.
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such nationals is cumbersome and counterproductive, this provision is one that
takes "into particular consideration the interests and needs of the developing
countries," according to the general principles and purposes articulated by the
General Assembly. 92 Scientists may nevertheless come to regard this provision
as one that in the long run safeguards their interests. John Knauss writes:
A scientist's reputation is dependent upon his ability to collect and interpret information. He is reluctant to make public any information before he has had ample
opportunity to examine it and to reflect upon its meaning. More often whole programs
have to be thrown out, or at least interpreted with considerable circumspection.
Scientists and organizations take considerable professional pride in the quality of data
attached to their names. Amongst the community of scientists, it is well known that
some individuals and some organizations are more careful than others. It takes longer
to win a reputation for careful and meticulous work than to lose it.93
Without the above provision on participation, coastal States may be adamant
about retaining all specimens, having access to all raw data, and publishing
reports immediately following the termination of sampling. Scientists can avoid
these pressures and have all the time needed to interpret adequately the raw
data before publishing if coastal State participation is continued in the
researchers' laboratories.
Publicationand the Rights to Raw Data
In the 1971 Subcommittee III negotiations, Mr. Beesley of the Canadian
delegation stated that "Perhaps the key [to agreement] lies in freedom of
research in exchange for freedom of information. '" 94 Scientists may argue that
there is no need for coastal States to worry about information regarding their
resources because they control these resources. This assertion is only partially
true for non-living and sedentary resources, and is untrue for fishery resources.
With regard to non-living and sedentary resources, it is unfair for the coastal
State to know less about its own resources than others know, particularly when
these others may at some time wish to bargain for licensing rights for
exploitation. With regard to fisheries resources, coastal States do not control
fish migrations. William L. Sullivan writes:
Fisheries research in contiguous zones by foreign scientists may well affect the
competitive fisheries situation between fishermen from coastal States and distant
water fishermen in the areas beyond the fisheries zone. 95
Absent provisions on participation, it would be of paramount priority for the
coastal State to have access to all raw data. However, with coastal State
nationals participating in analytical and interpretive, as well as data gathering
2

A/RES/2749 (XXV) 28 January 1971.
"Knauss, supra note 6 at 109.
14Mr. Beesley's speech at 16-17 (1971).
"Sullivan, supra note 49 at 372.
1
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roles, the only need is that the results or conclusion of the research be
published. It should be noted that the cost saved here in not making duplicates
of all raw data for coastal State inspection, as has been suggested by some,
should more than compensate for the added cost to researchers of subsidizing
participants and publishing findings.
The problem in drafting specific, objective provisions for the publication of
results is that publication costs could become so prohibitive that the spirit of
scientific inquiry could be chilled. The cost of publication, like the cost of
coastal State participation is the price scientists must expect to pay for freedom
of access. Nevertheless, the Convention should recognize the potential burden to
scientists and provide fair criteria which serve the purpose of the Convention.
The conclusions should be published in the languages of the scientists and of
the coastal State. The Convention should provide for a minimum number of
copies. 96 If the resolution of the resource problem results in the creation of an
international organization, this organization should undertake the dissemination of the scientific work. Without such an organization, the dissemination
function could be handled by an existing United Nations Agency.
Samples
The Convention should recognize the principle that any samples taken from
the resource zone in the course of scientific research are the property of the
coastal State 97 on loan in the interests of science to the researcher. The
Convention should provide a reasonable allotment of time for scientists to
undertake their analysis. After this time has passed, all specimens must be
returned to the coastal State. The coastal State may extend the time of
examination or waive its rights to the samples. In cases of applications for
extension, approval should be premised on the continued participation of
coastal State nationals in the research analysis.
Provisions such as these would avoid the numerous problems pointed out by
the publicists, and like other provisions, equitably balance the interests of both
scientists and coastal States. The major complaint of coastal States with
regard to samples is that many forms of research, particularly those pertaining
to fisheries and biology, necessitate taking many samples. From the coastal
States viewpoint, such expeditions may well be a guise for commercial
exploitation. The Convention requirement that all samples be returned to the
coastal State within a specified time would hopefully remove suspicion of the
coastal State and exclude any exploitation motive from scientific sampling.
98
Rather than stating that scientists should avoid taking "excessive samples"
"As many as the draft conventions suggest.
"Declaration of Lima (1970).
"Canadian Draft Principles.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 8, No. 2

258

INTERNATIONAL LA WYER

or that coastal States should be given an "equitable share" 99 of the samples,
the Convention gives the scientist full access to whatever samples are necessary.
This provision answers the fears of the scientific community that if coastal
States can limit what samples can be taken, coastal State authority may someday extend to the regulation of the substantive content of the research. As long
as the samples are in effect "on loan" to the scientists, scientists will be able to
pursue research uninhibited, and coastal States will be protected from
exploitation in the guise of research.
Fees
If coastal States may arbitrarily levy per diem charges on researchers, the
potential for chilling scientific inquiry through onerous requirements is very
great. Under the Convention, researchers must allocate considerable costs
beyond the research itself for training and maintenance of coastal State
participation during and after the expedition, for publishing the results, and for
administrative requirements of notice and return of samples.
There is no question that the cost burden of complying with Convention
provisions will divert substantial funds from the major purpose of the
enterprise: scientific investigation. 100 It has been seen that these costs are
necessary to insure freedom of access for researchers without prejudicing the
resource interests of the coastal States. These resource interests, however, are
not advanced by mere discouragement of research through a tariff system.
As has been demonstrated, scientific access to research in resource zones
under the Convention will not harm the coastal States' resource rights in any
way. On the contrary, the rights may be enhanced by training coastal State
scientists who may later aid in commercial exploitation. It therefore would be
inequitable, counterproductive and contrary to the principles of the Convention
to permit any fees to be levied. A provision of the Convention should make this
explicit.
Other Provisions and Considerations
The Convention should also include a general principle regarding the
interference of scientific research with the other uses of the resource zone.
Marine scientific research should not result in any unjustifiable interference
with any other marine activity. 101 Although the word "unjustifiable" is perhaps
an unfortunate echo of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, Article 5(1), it
nevertheless is necessary to use in stating the general principle, as it is
impossible within the bounds of the Convention adequately to discuss how to

"1973 Malta Draft.
"0'Burke, supra note 22.
"'Canadian Draft Principles, principle No. 4.
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deal with, for example, specific problems of research interfering with
exploitation.
The Canadian Draft Principles 102 suggested that scientific research is the
"common heritage of mankind." Such a principle has not been included in the
Convention because such theoretical overlays are not useful for confronting and
balancing a conflict between marine researchers and coastal States. To a
certain extent, the Convention provisions suggested, present a "common
heritage" approach in that scientific knowledge cannot become a proprietary
interest of either the researchers or the coastal States.
The results of the research are res communis with regard to the researchers
and coastal State participants, and in a sense, with regard to the entire world as
soon as they are published. For the Convention to call such knowledge the
"common heritage of mankind," however, would seem to imply the need for an
international mechanism of publishing, translating, disseminating and storing
the information, for it is difficult to see how something is the "common
heritage" if it can only be found, for example, on the shelves of specialized
scientific libraries in New York or Peru.
If this article has avoided issues dealing with the creation of an international
organization to oversee scientific research, it is because these issues are political
issues and not legal issues. The major issue is potential conflict between the
rights of the coastal State and the rights of scientists in the newly created
resource zone. Should international accord be reached with respect to an ocean
rgime, the Convention will apply with equal fairness in resolving dealings
between the ocean regime and the coastal State with regard to scientific
research.
The need for an international ocean r 6gime is obvious in this area. First, there
must be some kind of compulsory arbitration under the Convention provisions
when disputes arise. Second, there is the already mentioned need to implement
the policy of open publication to the fullest extent. An international organization could likewise facilitate the training of scientists and the transfer of
technology. 10 3 The third and most compelling argument for an international
ocean organization is the inability for any nation alone to solve the fundamental
scientific problems that face mankind. Multinational scientific efforts, such as
the Antarctic Treaty, are needed to realize the full scientific and resource
potential of the ocean. 104
' 2 d., principle No. 1.
' 3 ne detailed proposal on how an international organization like this might work is found in
Glazer, The InternationalSea Service 5, PACEM IN MARBus II 1 (Conference preliminary print.)
Introduced to the U.N. on 17 November 1971 in General Assembly Document A/C 2/271.
"'See, Working Paper Submitted by Peoples Republic of Bulgaria, The Uranian S.S.R., and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A/AC. 138/SC. 111/2.23 (3 August 1972); Declaration of Lima
(August, 1970); and Schaefer, supra note 55.
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In spite of these advantages, creation of an international ocean regime would
not necessarily insure a balance of rights. The present supranational
organizations, The International Oceanographic Commission and the
Intergovernmental Council of Scientific Unions, are notorious for serving the
scientific interests of developed countries. 10 5 It is not unreasonable to agree
with the developing nations that such organizations invariably serve the
interests of powerful, technologically advanced nations.
The Convention does not envision another international bureaucracy carrying
out vague policies for the benefit of the developed nations. All of the above
advantages for scientific research of an ocean r6gime can be realized through
existing agencies or through multilateral treaties. 106 It would therefore be
fruitless to create an international organization if the balance of rights stated in
the Convention had to be compromised.
I have premised this article on the probability that three ocean space regimes
will emerge from the 1974 Conference: a territorial sea to perhaps 12 miles, a
resource zone to not more than 200 miles, and the high seas. 107 Whether a
comprehensive international ocean regime is created, or the Conference ends in
a failure to agree on resource issues, 10 8 the proposed Convention on Marine
Scientific Research can be a viable part of post-1974 International Law of the
Sea. Absent agreement on resource issues, the Convention could protect
research and coastal State interests until the question of uniform national ocean
jurisdiction is solved. 1 09 If incorporated in the 1974 Law of the Sea
Conventions, nations could look forward to a balance of rights in the contiguous
resource zone which would benefit coastal States and scientists alike.
Conclusion
Warren Wooster states, "When intergovernmental agreements truly facilitate
10 Schaefer, supra note 21.
'O'Such as the treaties recently signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany
and Sweden. The Washington Post, 23 April 1973; and by the United States and Russia, The New
York Times, 20 June 1973, at 22.
°The premise is based on recent interviews with experienced negotiators and observers: H. Gary
Knight, Norman Wulf, Myron Nordquist and Francis T. Christy.
'0 It is, after all, in this area where the real pessimism lies. Wolfgang Friedmann worte; "With
every year or month that passes without the establishment of an effective international treaty,
national claims either to sovereignty over the sea-bed resources of the continental margin or to
widening areas of total ocean space jurisdiction will become consolidated and subsequently
defended as vested interests." Selden Redivious-Towards a Partition of the Seas?, 65 AJIL
758(1971). Mrs. Borgese has written that, "If the establishment of an ocean regime must await the
delimitation of national sovereignties out in the ocean, it will wait forever." Introduction to Constitutionalism and the Ocean Regime, 2 PACEM IN MARIBUS I 3.
""There would then be the problem of whether the convention superseded the provisions on
scientific research in the Continental Shelf Convention. The answer must be no, at least without an
agreement to delete art. 5.What would result without deletion is that there would be four regimes
for scientific research: the high seas, the territorial seas, the continental shelf, and the resource
zone. The width of the last three would vary on a State basis, but uniform rules would apply in each.
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scientific research, they make a substantial and positive contribution towards
man's mastery of the sea." 110 We have seen that the growing trend of extension
of resource zones has impaired scientific research in the oceans. The provisions
suggested here fill the growing gap between researchers and coastal States and
eliminate conflict by benefiting both sides. In return for freedom of access to
data, researchers agree to give notice to the coastal State, train their scientists in
an active program of participation, and publish the results. Scientists and
coastal States are the benefactors, but so is all mankind, who will utilize greater
scientific knowledge to help realize the potential bounty of the oceans' wealth.

"'Wooster, supra note 7.
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